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I n t r o d u c t i o n
The question of whether or not the taking of interest is legal or at least legitimate has
been discussed in the past over and over again. All great religions took up the issue, and
in most cases  the outcome was the prohibition of interest (for some time at least) or
regulation (see Schrader 1997). With the emergence of trading capitalism financial
instruments were required and used in economic long-distance transactions (e.g.
Braudel 1982) and economic necessities and religious morality had to come to an
arrangement. Finally an instrumental rationality came out of the modernisation process,
which sacrificed moral concerns for the sake of economic ones. Modern Islam,
however, has set codes of conduct even in the economic sphere which have been based
on religious grounds. An outcome of this is Islamic banking which operates within
rather narrow ethical boundaries. According to its self-understanding it provides an
alternative to Western banking for Muslim countries all over the world.
I shall start with a description of Islamic banking in theory and practice and present
the case of Malaysia. In the second part of this paper I shall interpret Islamic banking in
the light of the Islamic modernisation project, which is in some regards similar, and in
others different, to the Asiatic-values rhetoric. Finally I shall conclude that the Islamic
modernisation project is also an attempt to re-embed the economy in culture. From such
a perspective Islamic banking is not only an inner struggle between traditional and
modernist values, but a reaction to the Western, disembedded market model.
( 1 )  I s l a m i c  B a n k i n g  i n  T h e o r y  a n d  P r a c t i c e
Islamic banking is one of the fastest-growing segments of Middle Eastern finance and
also enjoys high popularity and growth in other Islamic countries. Dating back to 580
                                               
1 Paper presented at the Second EUROSEAS Conference, Hamburg, 3-6 September,
1998 in the panel 'The Culture of Southeast Asian Markets’.
2AD it experienced a certain period of practice,2 disappeared again but was kept alive by
religious disputes (Nazim Ali 1993). With growing economic requirements, often during
a period of colonial rule, Western-type banks were set up. Finally, in 1965
recommendations were passed by the Second Annual Conference of the College of
Islamic Research that 'interest charged on the various kinds of loans constitutes unlawful
usury, regardless of whether the loan is for what is called consumption or production'
and that 'much and little usury is unlawful' (Homoud 1985: 4). These recommendations
also included a call for joint effort of Muslim scholars, financiers and economists to
revive Islamic banking in practice.
Several Islamic countries reacted to this call. In the Egyptian city Meit Ghamr the first
Islamic savings bank was set up in the 1960s. Although the experiment was abandoned
in 1968, the idea was revived in 1971 with Nasser's Social Bank. Jordan and Dubai soon
followed the Egyptian example. In 1974 an agreement was reached by 23 Islamic states
to approve participation in the Islamic Bank for Development, the aim of which was
among other things to support the economic development and social progress of the
peoples of the member states and Islamic societies, in accordance with the Islamic law,
the Shari'a. 3 (Homoud: 1985: 5).
Nowadays Islamic banking is wide-spread in countries which practise Islamic law as
well as in countries with larger Islamic communities. Some of them (Sudan, Iran,
Pakistan) made Islamic banks mandatory while others developed a parallel structure of
Western and Islamic banks, so that the customers have a choice between the two. In
many cases even international banks have set up their Islamic bank branches,4 because
                                               
2 It should be emphasised that Islamic banking was an outcome of the Islamic trading
city states of the Arabian peninsula, and the guidelines were an adaptation to
pathologies such as individual hoarding and usury which impeded the development of
these city states (Wohlers-Scharff 1983: 75).
3 Shari'a, (Arabic, “the way”), refers to the body of laws and rules that regulate Muslim
life. These laws are an expression of God’s will, according to Muslim belief, although
derivation and application of the law depend on judicial interpretation of different
schools. Four principal sources provide inputs to the Shari'a: the Qur'an; the Sunnah
(collection of actions and sayings of the prophet); consensus of the schools in their
interpretations; and reasoning by analogy, derived from interpretations of Qur'an or the
Sunnah.
4 To mention some of these banks: ANZ Grindlays, Citibank, Bankers Trust New York
Corp., and Chase Manhattan Bank (Barraclough 1995).
3they are afraid to lose those Muslim customers who wish to lead a business live in
accordance with the religious guidelines.
Islamic banks are not allowed to engage in activities that are forbidden by the Shari'a
and therefore cut off from a number of financial instruments which are used by Western
banks. Prohibitions include the taking of interest (riba), speculation (gharar), and the
financing of certain activities that are prohibited by Islam, such as the production of, or
investment in, a distillery or gambling house. In Arabic riba means both 'usury' and
'interest'. There is no explicit prohibition of interest in the Qur'an or Sunnah. Therefore,
the meaning of riba depends on interpretation, which differs from one Islamic school to
the next.5 Most scholars, however, agree that both usury and the taking of interest are
not allowed. It is argued that Muslims have to provide benefits to the Islamic
community (Ummah) by promoting economic development and social welfare. This
requires investment in production and services. Capital increase by means of interest
offends this principle and is therefore harmful to community development.
In the same way Islam encourages consumers to purchase rather than keep money idle
by saving. Money constitutes purchasing power, and it cannot be increased other than
by doing purchases and sales. The making of profit is principally allowed, but its
predetermination is prohibited. This means that profit-oriented transactions have to be
subject to 'uncertain gain' (Cunningham 1990: 3-4; Zineldin 1990: 80; de Belderer et al.
1993: 13). In a strict sense of the principle, even inflation cannot be taken into account
in advance.
A good loan, which is called quard-e-hassan, is such where the lender does not charge
an interest or additional amount over the money lent.6 Some Islamic countries require a
certain percentage of transactions of banks as quard according to charity. Of course,
such loans are limited in number and amount. In banking practice, however, rather high
service charges are added to these interest-free loans. Critics say that these constitute
concealed interest which is an offence against the Shari'a. Practitioners reply that
                                               
5 Central to the question of riba is a verse in the Qur'an (LXIV: 18) which literally
means: 'When you provide God an [interest-free] loan, he will double it'. This verse,
strictly speaking, does not prohibit interest. Since the verse is literally, however, very
close to the riba-verse (also mentioning the 'doubling'), orthodox interpreters argue that
the Qur'an prohibits a compensation higher in value or quantity (Amereller 1995: Ch. 7)
6 In its classical dimension quard concerned the borrowing and lending of things and
intended to prohibit speculation in price differences.
4interest relates to time and service charges not, but that due to high fixed costs the
administration of small loans is considerably expensive.
From the theoretical perspective Islamic financial instruments7 have to be in line with
the premises set by the Shari'a. This means first of all, that banks offer a variety of fixed
terms instruments (e.g. security accounts, investment accounts, etc.) to the public to
raise funds, but instead of fixed returns in the form of interest, the customers share risks
and profits of the bank. In the case of current accounts the bank takes the risk, but does
not offer a return to the customer. Secondly, there are a number of trade-related and
investment-related financial instruments: mark-up pricing; financing with buy-back
agreement; financing of entrepreneur activity; discounting of trade bills; leasing; hire-
purchase; term finance certificates, and the like. Many of these are also found in
Western-style banking but some of them are Islamic inventions. I shall take a closer
look at mark-up pricing, financing with buy-back arrangement, financing of
entrepreneur activity, and rental or hire-purchase financing to show how financial
instruments avoid the interest prohibition.
(a) mark-up pricing or murabaha is an agreement according to which the bank
purchases goods for the borrower who pays a higher price to the bank at a future date.
During the specified period (often three months) the bank remains the nominal owner of
the goods and bears the risk. The surcharge depends on the type of commodities and
credit rating of the borrower. As a premise, it should not be related to the time involved
and therefore should not be increased if the loan period is extended.
(b) A special form of murabaha is the mark-up pricing under a buy-back arrangement,
which is more convenient to banks.8 While in ordinary mark-up transactions the bank
deals with both seller and borrower, in this case the user purchases the goods from the
original seller by himself with a credit from the bank. He nominally sells them to the
bank and signs a contract to buy them back with a surcharge after a specified period. In
case of default of borrowers banks usually reschedule the contract, due to limited
                                               
7 In the description of Islamic financial instruments I follow Amereller (1995);
Cornelisse and Steffelaar (1995); De Belder et al. (1993); Homoud (1985); and Kazarian
(1993); Wohlers-Scharff (1983).
8 Sale-repurchase contracts have always been appropriate for financial institutions and
agents in Islamic and non-Islamic countries to circumvent a prohibition or regulation of
interest (see Schrader 1997).
5liability of the borrowers,9 instead of filing a suit and receiving only meagre
compensation.
(c)  Mudaraba is an agreement of co-operation between a financier and an entrepreneur
who contributes his labour and skills. The arrangement is comparable to the Roman
commenda. Profits are shared according to a fixed ratio, while in case of losses the
financier loses part or whole of his capital input. According to Islamist theorists
mudaraba is a desirable arrangement because the financier assists somebody with little
financial means and is motivated more by charity than by economic aspects. This
assumption holds, perhaps, true for small communities with face-to-face relations but of
course not for modern economies where borrowers and lenders do not know each other.
(d)  Rental financing (ijara)  functions in that way that the bank acquires equipment or
buildings and make them available to the client with a rent contract. In hire-purchase
financing (jjara wa iktina) the tenant pays instalments into a savings account and finally
achieves the rented objects. The reinvested capital of this savings account usually works
in favour of the bank.
The requirements to Islamic banking constitute a dilemma for its operation: the
dilemma of adverse returns-risk between lender and borrower and a problem of moral
hazards for lenders. Since banks have to take a lenient position towards borrowers and,
if necessary, postpone the repayment, particularly risky borrowers seek such contracts,
while secure borrowers are punished with the high risk premium - an outcome of the
borrowers' structure. Banks in turn do not favour such arrangements because of their
weak legal position towards borrowers. Furthermore, since the contracts are based on
profit-sharing, borrowers aim at understating their real profits.
(e) In musharaka arrangements parties contribute capital for a certain project. Risks and
revenues are divided according to pre-fixed rations. In Western terminology this is
equity participation. This financial instrument is more convenient to banks than the
mudaraba. They often provide capital for a certain project and obtain stocks of the
enterprise.
                                               
9 In Pakistan, for example, they are liable only to the mark-up price plus liquidated
damages of a maximum of 20 percent of this price. As the courts work very slowly real
losses would exceed this by far (Cornelisse and Steffelar 1995: 694).
6I s l a m i c  B a n k i n g  i n  M a l a y s i a10
Malaysia has a parallel structure of Western-type and Islamic banks. Bank Islam
Malaysia Berhad constitutes the top provider in Islamic banking and started this service
in 1983 according to pressure of Muslims on the government.11 The bank was
incorporated as a limited company under the Companies Act of 1965, and an Islamic
Banking Act was issued, due to the fact that the ordinary banking act referred to
interest-based operations. The main shareholders of the bank was the government with
almost 30 percent, followed by the State Religious Council which kept 25 percent.
Nowadays the bank operates with more than 60 branches across the country.
Interestingly, only 40 percent of the bank's clients are Muslims. The reason is that the
bank is highly competitive to Western-type banks with regard to returns to customers.
During the past five years the availability of Islamic financial instruments has been
increasing. Malaysia has become the first country that has an Islamic banking system
which offers a wide spectrum of Islamic financial instruments.
In 1993 a second bank, Bank Rakyat, converted into interest-free banking. It provides
co-operative banking and serves mainly individuals and retailers. Furthermore, almost
40 conventional banks, which are afraid to lose their Muslim customers, have
introduced their Islamic bank sub-divisions. One of them is Maybank, the largest bank
in Malaysia.
The Islamic banks in Malaysia offer returns on an interest-free profit-and-risk-sharing
basis, and credit facilities through a number of schemes. They receives deposits from
the public in the form of current accounts, savings accounts, investment accounts and
special investment accounts. Savings accounts are run free of cost without providing
interest or profit and mainly serve as safe-keeping (al-wadiah) of funds. The banks get
permission from the customer to work with the capital. For savings accounts the banks
may reward the customer a share of the bank profits. Investment accounts are term
deposits, which the customer invests into the bank enterprise. The customer shares
                                               
10 Here I follow Ariff (1988), Man 1988), Hiebert (1995) and Barraclough (1995).
11 The attempts to institutionalise Islamic banking date back to 1969 with the Pilgrims'
Management and Fund Board and the Pilgrims' Affairs Department which was set up by
the government to support all Muslim activities for pilgrimage.
7profits and risks according to a specified ratio. Special investment accounts are accounts
of the government or corporate customers which work like investment accounts.
Project and trade financing of the bank functions according to the mudaraba and
musharaka principles and include mark-up financing, deferred-payment sales, hire-
purchase and leasing. Furthermore the financial services include stock brokerage,
government bonds an insurance fund according to Islamic principles. BIMB Securities
is a stock brokerage which Bank Islam owns by 70 percent. It avoids speculative
ventures and does not deal in stocks of companies which offend against the Shari'a.
Among the more than 500 listings of the KL Stock Exchange (before the crisis) more
than half are acceptable for Islamic banking. It is expected that this brokerage may
become attractive for foreign Muslims too. On government bonds the central bank
provides a share of returns instead of interest. The trustee profit-sharing insurance
scheme 'Suarykat Takaful Malaysia' is organised in such way that customers who do not
make claims obtain profit shares when their polices expire.12
Among the most popular Islamic financial instruments is pawnbrokerage. Like in other
countries it serves mainly poor people. A great number of Bank Rakyat branches offers
pawnbrokerage according to Islamic principles. Instead of interest it takes a fixed fee
per month, which is in many cases much cheaper for the customers than conventional
pawnshops.13 The bank's pawnshops only accepts gold and provide loans up to 50
percent of value of the pawns for a period of six months, after which a three-months
extension can be obtained. Then the pawn is sold if not having been redeemed.
Critics hold that Malaysian Islamic banks take up quasi-interest operations, because
Malaysia's parallel banking system provides a highly competitive environment. The
returns of Western banks in the form of interest, and Islamic banks in forms of non-
interest are finally almost the same. Contrary to the critique of orthodox Muslim
scholars, progressive ones blame the Islamic banks in Malaysia to be not innovative
enough. For example, they have failed to develop one particular market niche which is
characteristic to the Islamic principles: social banking to help the poor. In addition to
                                               
12 One wonders, however, if such a schemes is not contrary to the principle of solidarity
which is important for Islamic law.
13 Conventional pawnshops usually take an interest of 2 percent per month.
8pawnbrokerage the financing of social projects and basic infrastructure might fit into
this category. Furthermore new instruments have to be invented for current or savings
accounts to compete with conventional instruments, such as overdrafts and short-term
advances.
To summarise the issue of Islamic banking in theory and practice, from the Western
economic point of view - and this is the perspective most scholars take - Islamic law and
ethics provide a quite narrow corset to financial, as well as commercial transactions. In a
number of Islamic countries the Shari'a plays an important role and structures everyday-
live and the economy. On the other hand, Muslim scholars and bankers refer to high
growth rates of Islamic banking which proves that it provides an alternative to Western-
type banking. Indeed, this cannot be denied, but in absolute numbers as well as market
shares it is still comparatively small, except in countries without parallel banking
structure, such as in Sudan, Pakistan or Iran. So far the majority of Muslim bank
customers are no customers of Islamic banks, and a number of Muslim investors seek
the most lucrative investment opportunities for their capital, be they Islamic, quasi-
Islamic or Western, in spite of the Shari'a.
Nevertheless, the largest Islamic banks are expected to grow further. For the Middle
East it has been prognosticated that they will capture at least 50 percent of savings
during the next decade.14 However, a handicap is that there is not yet general acceptance
of financial instruments in different Islamic countries, because the religious committees
of the national Islamic banks differ in their strictness with the application of Islamic law.
Therefore a number of Islamic banks do not use the wide range of financial
instruments that theory offers, but have a strong inclination towards instruments which
are very similar to interest-based financial transactions, and the returns in interest or
non-interest are often almost the same. Scholars argue that Islamic banks are getting
under pressure of expectations of their customers. Even Muslim customers of Islamic
banks have begun to require returns for their deposits, and Muslim investors threaten to
shift their capital to western-type banks, be they abroad or in their own countries. This
has also contributed to the weakening of strictness of the application of Islamic law. A
                                               
14 Among these large banks are Kuwait Finance House and Al-Rajhi Banking and
Investment Corporation (Kuwait), Jordan Islamic Bank, Faysal Islamic Bank of Bahrain,
to mention some.
9number of Islamic banks offer such instruments which in their returns are comparable to
interest-based financial instruments. Middle Eastern banks, on the other hand, have
begun to offer non-interest returns as a compromise between economic requirements
and religious thresholds. Savers obtain certain compensations such as flights to Mecca
instead of interest on their savings.
But Islamic banks do not only react to their customers' wants; they are economic
actors as well. As long as they are state banks their economic standing will perhaps be
less important than in case of private banks or even Islamic branches of Western banks.
Statistical evidence suggests that Islamic banks invested large amounts of capital in
interest-bearing transactions in foreign banks instead of providing interest-free finance
to the Islamic world.
On the other hand, also ordinary people with small savings, who want to lead a
religiously adequate life, belong to the customers of Islamic banks. In many cases the
banking and religious spheres are not strictly differentiated from one another, so that
Islamic banks raise savings in offices on the ground of a mosque, and also the mullahs
take direct influence on economic life. Kazarian (1993) rightly emphasises that Islamic
banks take a positive role in mobilising savings from lower-income people, who would
otherwise not have access to banks.
Now it is my intention to provide a potential explanation to the wide gap between theory
and practice of Islamic banking. I believe that a tentative answer can be found in an
alternative concept of modernity and an intrinsic tension in the process of
modernisation, which becomes particularly visible in the Islamic world.
( 2 )  W e s t e r n  a n d  N o n - W e s t e r n  M o d e r n i t y  a n d  t h e  R e -
e m b e d d i n g  o f  M a r k e t s
Modernity constitutes the key concept of societal and economic development. It
emerged as a European project during Enlightenment. With the expansion of capitalism
and particularly colonialism it spread around the world as a universal idea.
"The local law of Western civilisation that called itself modernity could
be articulated as universal and felt like universal thanks to the universality
of the embrace in which the West squeezed the rest of the human globe: it
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was the globality of their domination that allowed Europeans to project
'their civilisation, their history, their knowledge as civilisation, history
and knowledge überhaupt" (Bauman 1995: 22-3, quoting Klemm 1993:
19).
Modernisation is the way from tradition to modernity, a process which required the
destruction of the old social structure (Eisenstadt 1979), disenchantment of the world,
secularisation and rationalisation of life (Weber 1950). It engendered a functional
differentiation of society into distinct sub-systems (Parsons 1952) which in turn
developed different system rationalities (e.g. Luhmann 1984). However, an intrinsic
tension is subject to modernity which relates to the distinction between formal and
substantive rationality (Weber 1985: 45 ff.; Polanyi 1979: 209 ff.), their different
qualities, guidelines to action and underlying ethics (see Evers and Schrader 1994).
Modernity sacrifices substantive concerns for the sake of rationalisation and efficiency.
This tension is even more felt in countries where a colonial state established itself on
pre-modern policies and finally withdrew, leaving a cultural, legal and bureaucratic
heritage, on which the new, post-colonial states emerged (Stauth 1992: 7).
Contemporary modernisation theories break with the conventional, static concepts of
tradition and modernity. The latter is no longer an end that will sooner or later be
achieved by all societies, but an ongoing process. It can only be explained by its
antonym: tradition (Dumont 1986). It involves a specific, reflected organisation of the
past in relation to the present (Giddens 1990; Beck et al. 1994; Eisenstadt 1998). In the
same way tradition is not simply the past, it is the product of reflection on
modernisation: it has been invented (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). And finally, its
universality has been challenged by non-western scholars, who deconstructed it as an
Occidental product. They search for modernities in accordance with their own cultures.
An expression of this intellectual confrontation are the ongoing cultural-value debates,
two of which are 'the Asiatic' or 'Islamic way to modernity'. Southeast Asian politicians
and Islamic religious leaders set apart from the West with anti-western, and particularly
anti-American, ideologies and sentiments. According to their rhetoric western modernity
is individualistic, and therefore destructive, leading to a dead alley which manifests
itself in anomie (disorientation, increase of criminality, inter-generation conflict, etc.)
and an economic crisis. The maintenance and support of non-western values on an
indigenous path to modernity, however, can avoid these pathologies, because it is
believed that the own values are superior to western ones. In both discourses they stand
for collectivism (family or 'imagined family' of people sharing the same identity or
cultural context - forming a community), order and morality, consensus and submission
11
to higher authority. Responsibilities towards kinship and community range higher than
individual rights and aims. 15
The Asiatic-values debate, which has extensively been commented by a number of
scholars (see e.g. Dupont 1996; Jeung Lee 1995; Heberer 1997), is rooted in the
Confucian, and the Islamic-values debate in the Muslim heritage. Interestingly the
Islamic countries in Southeast Asia actively participate in the former instead of referring
to the latter debate. An explanation to this will be attempted later. Now I shall raise the
question, what is particularly 'non-western' to the supposed 'non-western values'.
According to Senghaas (1995: 25) there is nothing particular, but the alleged non-
western, values are identical to the European values of yesterday. The more astonishing
is that also western, particularly conservative, scholars who in Weberian tradition not
very long ago considered such values as the main impediment to development, now
celebrate those attributes which are expressed by 'Asiatic values' as components of
postmodern society and as a possible way out of the western economic crisis, whereas
they call the same values in the Islamic discussion 'fundamentalist'. The other way
around, what Asian politicians or Islamists conceive as 'western values', is not
traditionally western, but an outcome of modernisation: individualism, pluralism,
majority principle, participation, and the like. Traditional European values were
similarly collectivist as the assumed non-western ones, but they lost importance or
changed in the course of modernisation.
What is addressed in these non-western values are the attributes of 'community',
however, they are uncoupled from tradition: they get an important symbolic function
within the project of modernity. Modern societies and conglomerates of people with
shared identity such as religion, citizenship or civilisation, constitute 'imagined (or
substitute, H.S.) communities' (Anderson 1983). They are addressed by kinship
                                               
15 "Asiatic values" comprise collectivism and group interests instead of individuality;
reliability towards community instead of individual rights and freedom; paternalistic,
family-oriented, consensual and clientelist political action instead of pluralism and
democracy; respect and acceptance of authority and social order; higher rating of
personal relations rather than personal qualities; harmony and consensus instead of
discourse and confrontation, conflict and competition; higher rating of ethics and
morality before law; and specific values of business ethics: diligence, hard work, thrift
and frugality, self-discipline, obedience, patience (e.g. Robison 1996, Rodan 1997). The
rhetoric on Islamic values is similar.
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terminology,16 and the assumed attributes of relationship such as trust, brother- and
sisterhood, or self-sacrifice for the common good are ingredients of the glue of society
which allows peaceful coexistence, provides an identity of participating in a joint,
indigenous modernisation project, and smoothens the tension which is intrinsic to
modernity. Community and substitute community have an underlying, sense-giving,
uniting ethics - be it religious, philosophical, nationalist or fascist. Islam particularly
makes extensive use of such symbols. The Ummah, the community of Muslims, is
perceived as trustful per se because of sharing the same faith and following the Shari'a.
Modernity is characterised by an immanent tension between transcendental and
profane order which has manifested itself in the revitalisation of cultural tradition and
setting apart from western modernity in a number of non-western countries  (Eisenstadt
1998: 9ff.; Stauth 1998: 132ff.). All these countries where the discussion and
ideologisation of non-western values take place, are in a process of economic, social
and political change. During the last decades East and Southeast Asia experienced rapid
economic growth, from which not only the elite, but also larger parts of the population
could benefit. They constitute an emerging middle class which opts for democratisation
and political pluralism. The Asiatic-value ideologisation has therefore rightly been
interpreted as an attempt of the old political and economic elite to secure its diminishing
power and legitimacy of force (e.g. Jeung Lee 1995; Dupont 1996; Rodan 1997;
Heberer 1997).
The Middle East, however, has been characterised by a deep chronic development
crisis and no visible promising ways out of it (Senghaas 1995: 26). According to Stauth
(1995: 92-96) the image of Europe and its modernisation influenced the thinking and
politics of national elites, and they even adopted the European view of Arabic static
tradition. As an outcome of this view, modernisation projects were very technical and
instrumental. The backward looking class of orthodox religious leaders in turn held on
the absolute validity of Islamic law as opposed to secular, western law. In everyday-life
this tension takes a number of facets. For example, in Oman, Kuwait, Libya and the
Arab Emirates the toleration of interest in commercial law is opposed by its prohibition
in civil law.
                                               
16 Typically used terms are such 'community of brothers and sisters', 'mother nation', or
'father state'.
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According to Stauth recent modernists have critically reflected on their intrinsic
cultural values in search of an alternative to Western modernity, to overcome the
tension between (the adapted) modernity and (the perceived) tradition within their own
culture. They aim to abolish the monopoly of interpretation of the scripts with regard to
law and morality and to re-interpret these in a rationalist, utilitarian and functional way,
to reconstruct moral and religious considerations and combine them with social aspects
of modern life (Stauth 1995; 1992: 8).
In analogy to this interpretation my view on Islamic banking is that the wide gap
between theory and practise is an expression of this tension that is an outcome of
disenchantment of the world and change on the one hand, and continuity of sacracy and
transcendence, manifested in a powerful religious elite which sets the rules of life with a
monopoly in interpreting the scripts. Intrinsic to Islamic modernity is an incompatibility
of religious ethics and secular means-end rationality.17
Perhaps it is the western perception of the Asian miracle (which in spite of the current
crisis will continue in the longer run, although with lower growth rates) and its
relatedness to modernity, compared to the more cautious, if not even disapproving
attitude towards the Islamic world, which can provide an explanation, why the Islamic
countries in Southeast Asia prefer to take part in, and to be associated with, the Asiatic,
and not the Islamic-value debate. Probably it is also the inner, self-reliant view of East
and Southeast Asia to have economically caught up with the West, what attracts Mahatir
and associates. Most ASEAN states, and Malaysia in particular, have taken a radical
pro-market course which has not by chance recently been called 'market
fundamentalism' (Evers and Gerke 1997: 4) and is associated with modernity per se (c.f.
Bourdieu 1991). Perhaps also Huntington (1993) backed them up with his unreasonable
hypothesis of Confucian-Islamic coalition against the West, in which the Islamic states
in Southeast Asia, and particularly Malaysia, would take a key intermediate position.
                                               
17 Homoud (1995: 5) himself is a victim of this tension by arguing that the philosophy
of banking was originally copied from its European origins and implanted into the
Islamic world, without being appropriate to it. He explains that European banking
philosophy is based on the convergence of capital with capital. This deprives a number
of people of taking advantage of the big business, because they do not own anything
except their labour power. He continues that in such a philosophy there is no place for
the convergence of capital and labour as in the old partnership contracts which have
been revived in Islamic banking.
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However, beyond a pure ideology, the search of non-western modernity is particularly
in the Islamic world an expression of disapproval of what forms one of modernity's key
elements: materialism and supremacy of the economy to the social, cultural and
religious realm. Both reformers and fundamentalists emphasise the social aspects of
Islam, which include social justice and co-operation (Stauth 1992: 11-12) and . Islamic
concepts take an opposition to excessive accumulation and wealth while, at the same
time, they differ from socialism in an acceptance of private property and ownership of
the means of production (Wohlers-Scharff 1983: 74). One critical modernist (Shari'ati
1980: 97-122, see Stauth 1992: 12), for example, argues that society envisaged by Islam
is purposefully directed and not left alone or neglected as in the so-called welfare states
of the West. Social justice in Islam means to positively involve in society. Reference to
family and community as the providers of social security is the expression of this in the
Asiatic-values debate. In the Malaysian discourse goals such as ethnic balance and
social justice have been emphasised to build up a 'caring society' (Evers and Gerke
1997: 5).
Here I see parallels to the Communitarianist approach which aims at reconstructing
community within society. Communitarianists favour a community which is
characterised by a well balanced relation between individual rights and social
responsibilities, because the consequences of modernisation require consensus on a new
- the right - course into future. Society is subdivided in nets which provide moral
authorities. Praised are those who do well and blamed those who offend against
community values and norms. State authorities intervene in case that all other
disciplinary measures fail. The more functioning community, the less necessary is state
control (Etzioni 1995: x-xi).
Both the non-western project of modernity and the project of Communitarianism try to
overcome the intrinsic tension of modernity by means of strengthening the social realm.
Both concepts are therefore in some way comparable to western post-materialist
thinking which re-introduces reason and discourse to encapsulate economic or material
issues within social, cultural, ecological and ethical boundaries (see e.g. Beck, Giddens
and Lash 1994; Habermas 1990; Gasper 1996). Both concepts, however, differ in their
rhetoric. The former is perceived as a modern, non-western ethics on religious and
social grounds, the latter as a postmodern, deontological ethics - a self-restriction to
higher, binding goals and action according to these. What really happens in both
discourses is a re-embedding of markets in culture and society.
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